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ABSTRACT
The object-capability model is a security measure that consists in
encoding access rights in individual objects to restrict its interac-
tions with other objects. Since its introduction in 2013, different
approaches to object-capability have been formalized and imple-
mented. In this paper, we present the object-capability model, and
present and discuss the state-of-the-art research in the area. In the
end, we conclude, that object capabilities can help in increasing the
security of software, although this concept is not widely spread.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→ Software security engineering;Web
application security; • Software and its engineering→ Soft-
ware safety; Object oriented frameworks; Software design engineer-
ing.
KEYWORDS
object-capability, capability, access control, authority, permission
1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, many applications rely on external libraries to function
correctly. However, including third-party libraries also opens an
attack surface. Not all third-party programs are trustful or secure.
A means to reduce security risks is to introduce access-control
mechanisms, such as the object-capability model, introduced by
Mark Miller in his doctoral dissertation [13].
In the object-capability model, which is designed for object-
oriented languages, objects are used to manage access control. Spe-
cific objects can only access the behaviour they need, if they have
a direct reference to the object providing that behaviour, following
the terms of authority and permission. Those terms are used to
model the access control, with permission being the right to invoke
certain behaviour on the targeted object, while authority describes
the ability to cause effects on an object [8].
In the past few years, new research was conducted on different
areas of object-capabilities. Some focus on the formalism of the
model [8], while others concentrate on analyzing security prop-
erties in that system [15]. Another common research topic is the
study of typical problems of object-capabilities [4, 5]. Although ca-
pability safety was proven to imply authority safety [10], the formal
characterization of object capabilities is not sufficient for verifying
an application [3]. Nonetheless, it is possible to check for violations
of object-capabilities with the help of model checking [17].
In this paper, we explain the concept of object-capability model,
along with background information on related topics such as access
1 main(){
2 B B = new B()
3 A A = new A(B) // A -> B
4 C C = new C()
5 A.B.doSomething ()
6 }
7
8 A {
9 B;
10 D:
11 new A(B){
12 B = B
13 D = new D() // A -> D
14 }
15 }
Listing 1: Simple example for object-capabilities.
control, authority, and permission. We then detail recent publica-
tions on object-capability, first looking at papers that focus on the
formal aspect of object-capability, like introducing and analyzing
different concepts of object-capability. Second, we present papers
which focus on the implementation of object-capabilities and the
advantages of the model for applications at a whole. Finally, the last
category we explore includes papers that take a different approach
to object-capability, for example, by analysing the corresponding
model [5] or how to automatically check for flaws in the model
with the help of a model checker [17]. In the last part of the paper,
we summarize the current state of the object-capability model, and
discuss open questions on the topic.
2 THE OBJECT-CAPABILITY MODEL
In this section, we explain the object-capability model, and the
notions of authority and permission.
2.1 Object-Capabilities
The object-capability model was introduced by Mark Miller in his
doctoral thesis in 2006 [13]. This security model is used to con-
trol accesses to particular parts of a program, in order to restrict
potential malicious behaviour. A capability is defined as a token
that describes access-rights, and object-capabilities as capabilities
applied to object-oriented languages. In the object-capability model,
this token is thus a reference to a specific object. An object can only
interact with another object if it has the capability for the specific
object. The example shown in Listing 1 and Figure 1 shows a simple
implementation of the model.
The object-oriented program in Listing 1 contains three objects:
A, B, and C. A receives a reference to B in its constructor, while B and
C do not get any references. Following the object-capability model,
AB D C
Figure 1: Object-capabilities from Listing 1. Edges represent
references between the different objects of the program.
A is allowed to call methods on B, while the other two objects can
only use their own methods. In addition, A also has a reference to
D, since it creates the object. References are encoded in a reference
graph, which also represents the given capabilities. The reference
graph for Listing 1 is shown in Figure 1.
Note that no matter at which point of the program execution the
capability is created, the capability is valid over the entire execution,
and the object owning a reference to another can invoke behaviour
on that latter object. There are multiple ways to gain capabilities
for an object:
• The easiest one is to create a new instance of the desired
object. By creating the object the creator object receives the
reference and therefore the capability for the created object.
In the example in Listing 1 this happens for A and D, where
the former gets a reference to the later by creating it.
• It is also possible to introduce objects to one another. In the
example, A could have introduced B to C or the other way
around.
• Another way to get a capability is to be born with it. This is
also shown in the example, with A being constructed with a
direct reference to B.
2.1.1 Capability-safety. A language is capability-safe with respect
to object-capability if it is restricted in a way that enforces the
object-capability model. The most important restriction is that there
should be no globally accessible mutable states [3]. This restriction
enforces all communication between objects to be done over the
capabilities. Many common object-oriented languages, such as Java,
can be used in a capability-safe way if these restrictions are met in
the whole program. In the case of Java, this means not using static
variables, since they are shared between all instances of a class.
2.2 Authority and Permission
The notions of authority and permission are broadly used to dis-
cuss the properties of the object-capability model. These terms
were first introduced informally by Mark Miller along the object-
capability model itself [13]. He formalized them later together with
Drossopoulou et al. [8].
To argue about permission and authority on a formal level,
we first introduce notations for program states, following
Drossopoulou et al.’s paper [8].
2.2.1 Background. In the following, we assume a capability-safe
language, i.e., we assume no global variables and that the behaviour
of an object can only be called if the caller has the reference to the
specific object. We also assume a small step operational semantic,
meaning that only one computation step can be executed at a time,
which we formalize as follows:
P ⊢ σ , stmts ⇝ σ ′, sr
where σ is the state of the program at runtime, and stmts are state-
ments of the program. sr is either a new statement or result. For
example, for the Null state, any number or object can be a result.
An example language that fits the requirements as well as the defi-
nitions for the states, is detailed in Drossopoulou et al.’s paper [8].
σ ⇝? σ ′ is called the liberal execution, and describes every
possible program execution. In other words, it is the set of every
possible computation sequence starting in σ and resulting in σ ′.
Moving on to the operational semantics, the behaviour of the
program is modelled in a similar way. We define the behavioural
description B, such that
B ⊢ σ , stmts ⇝ σ ′, sr
where B ensures that the liberal execution holds. This description
corresponds to a large range of behaviour such as low-level mecha-
nisms or policy specifications [8].
Since all executions of a program are characterized by B, then
B also characterizes the program, which leads to the following
definition:
Definition 2.1.
P ⊂ B ⇔ ∀σ ,σ ′, stmts, sr : P ⊢ σ , stmts ⇝ σ ′, sr
=⇒ B ⊢ σ , stmts ⇝ σ ′, sr
The definition, the small step operational semantic, the liberal
execution, and the behavioural description allow us to construct
three so-called future worlds, which describe how the program will
look like in the next state. These worlds, called the Eventual World
(EW), the Behaviour World (BW), and the Maximal World (MW),
are defined as follows:
Definition 2.2.
EW (P ,σ ) ≡ {σ ′ |∃ stms, sr : P ⊢ σ , stmts ⇝∗ σ ′, sr }
BW (B,σ ) ≡ {σ ′ |∃ stms, sr : B ⊢ σ , stmts ⇝∗ σ ′, sr }
MW (σ ) ≡ {σ ′ |σ ⇝?∗ σ ′}
As stated in the Definition 2.2, EWs are reachable by a pro-
gram, BWs are created following a behavioural description, and
MWs are created by the liberal execution. With these definitions,
Drossopoulou et al. derive the following inclusions:
Lemma 2.3. ∀ program P , behavioural description B and state σ :
• σ ⊆ EW (P ,σ ) ⊆ MW (σ )
• BW (P ,σ ) ⊆ MW (σ )
• P ⊂ B =⇒ EW (P ,σ ) ⊆ BW (B,σ )
The full proof is found in Drossopoulou et al.’s paper [8].
2.2.2 Permission. The concept of permission is described as the
right to access an object directly and invoke its behaviour [8, 13].
With the definitions of the worlds, it is possible to create four
different types of permission.
The first permission type is the base permission called Current
Permission (CP).
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Definition 2.4.
CP(σ ,o) ≡ {o} ∪ {o′∃f : σ (o, f ) = o′} ∪
{o′ |o = σ (this) ∧ ∃x .σ (x) = o′}
Where o is an object. The base permission states that if a subject
has a direct access right to the object, it can invoke its behaviour.
σ (this) is a receiver of a currently executed method.
With the base permission, it is possible to define the three other
types of permissions: the Eventual Permission (EP), the Behaviour
Permission (BP), and the Maximal Permission (MP):
Definition 2.5.
EP(P ,σ ,o) ≡
⋃
σ ′∈EW (P,σ )
CP(σ ′,o) ∩ dom(σ )
BP(B,σ ,o) ≡
⋃
σ ′∈BW (P,σ )
CP(σ ′,o) ∩ dom(σ )
MP(σ ,o) ≡
⋃
σ ′∈MW (P,σ )
CP(σ ′,o) ∩ dom(σ )
EP are the permissions that are eventually created by a program
P , BP are those created by a behavioural description and MP are
those created by liberal executions.
Since the permissions are derived from the definition of worlds,
we derive the following lemma:
Lemma 2.6. ∀ program P , behavioural description B, and state σ :
• CP(σ ,o) ⊆ EP(P ,σ ,o) ⊆ MP(σ ,o)
• CP(σo) ⊆ BP(B,σ ,o) ⊆ MP(σ ,o)
• P ⊂ B =⇒ EP(P ,σ ,o) ⊆ BP(B,σ ,o)
2.2.3 Authority. In contrast to permission, authority describes the
possibility to invoke behaviour on an object with out a direct link.
Similarly to permission, we can define four types of authority: the
base Current Authority (CA), the Eventual Authority (EA), the
Behaviour Authority (BA), and the Maximal Authority (MA).
Definition 2.7.
CA(P ,σ ,o) ≡{o′ |∃σ ′′,m,o1, . . . ,on .
o ∈ CP(σ ,σ (this))∧
∀i ∈ {1..n}.oi ∈ CP(σ ,o)∧
P ⊢ σ ′′,x .m(x1, . . . xn )⇝∗ σ ′, _∧
σ ′′ = σ [x 7→,x1 7→ o1, . . . xn 7→ on ]∧
σ (offl, f ) , σ ′(o′, f )}
EA(P ,σ ,o) ≡
⋃
σ ′∈EW (P,σ )
CA(σ ′,o) ∩ dom(σ )
BA(B,σ ,o) ≡
⋃
σ ′∈BW (P,σ )
CA(σ ′,o) ∩ dom(σ )
MA(σ ,o) ≡
⋃
σ ′∈MW (P,σ )
CA(σ ′,o) ∩ dom(σ )
With this definition, the CA(o) permission contains every object
which might be altered by calling a method. This means that the
authority has the ability to modify an object. In this case, the subject
does not need to have a direct permission to the object to be altered,
16 class A(){
17 int x;
18 }
19
20 class B(){
21 A a
22 B(A a) { this.a = a; } // b --> a
23 inc() { a.x ++; }
24 }
25
26 class C() extends B{
27 inc(){};
28 }
29
30 class D(){
31 B b;
32 D(B b){ this.b = b; } // d --> b
33 inc(){ b.inc(); }
34 }
35
36 main(){
37 a = new A();
38 b = new B(a); // b -> a
39 c = new C(a); // c -> a
40 d = new D(b); // d -> b
41 }
Listing 2: Example program for authority and
permission.
ab
c
d
Figure 2: Access path from Listing 2. Solid lines are indicate
permissions, dashed lines indicate authority.
as it can happen over other method calls. Like for permissions, the
following holds:
Lemma 2.8. ∀ program P , behavioural description B, and state σ :
• CA(σ ,o) ⊆ EA(P ,σ ,o) ⊆ MA(σ ,o)
• CA(σo) ⊆ BA(B,σ ,o) ⊆ MA(σ ,o)
• P ⊂ B =⇒ EA(P ,σ ,o) ⊆ BA(B,σ ,o)
With these definitions, it is possible for an object to have au-
thority but not permission over another object, and vice versa. We
illustrate this in the example in Listing 2 and Figure 2.
As shown in the graph, b has permission and authority over a,
since it has a direct reference to it and also can modify a. On the
other hand, c can not modify a, as it does have authority over it. It
has therefore no authority over a, although it has the permission
on it. Finally, d can modify awithout knowing it directly: by calling
the increase()method from b, which in turn modifies a. So, d has
authority over a, but no permission.
3
3 PAST RESEARCH ON OBJECT-CAPABILITY
APPROACHES
In this section, we detail past research on the topic of object-
capability. We first present papers focusing on formalization, then
on implementation, and finally, on the papers that do not fit well
into the those sections.
3.1 Formal Aspect of Object-Capability
Many papers address the formalization of the object-capability
model, with the goal of proving particular security properties with
the help of object-capability.
In 2003, Miller et al. [14] presented common myths on the topic
of capabilities in their paper“Capability Myths Demolished” [14].
In their paper, they address three myths: the equivalence myth, the
irrevocability myth and the confinement myth, which result form
different interpretations of capability. The first myth states that
access-control list systems and capability systems are equivalent,
and the second, that capability-based access cannot be revoked.
The last myth states that a capability system is not able to enforce
confinement. Miller et al. demonstrate that the three myths only
hold for intermediate securitymodels, but not for the pure capability
model, or the object-capability model.
One of the most influential publications on the topic of object-
capability is Mark Miller’s doctoral thesis, called ”Robust Composi-
tion: Towards a Unified Approach to Access Control and Concur-
rency Control" [13]. The thesis introduces the object-capability
model, and the core terms of authority and permission. Therefore
this thesis can be considered as the foundation of object-capability.
Miller developed these concepts on the basis of the already existing
concept of capabilities and extended it to objects.
Another influential paper is “Permission and Authority Revisited
towards a formalisation” [8] by Drossopoulou et al. In this paper,
the concepts of authority, permission, and object-capability are
extended and fully formalized, as this was left out in Miller’s thesis.
Maffeis et al. show that capability safety implies authority safety
in the paper“Object Capabilities and Isolation of Untrusted Web
Applications” [10]. Authority safety is defined with two proper-
ties: first, an object can only influence the authority of an object
whose authority influences its own authority. Second, the change
of authority for an object is bounded by the authority of the acting
object. These properties are enough to ensure isolation and, as a
result, can be used to isolate untrusted code.
In 2010, Murray promoted the construction of patterns to enforce
security properties in his thesis “Analysing Security Properties of
Object-Capabilities” [15]. To describe a pattern, he uses Communi-
cating Sequential Processes (CSP) and analyzes it with the help of a
refinement-checker. In his thesis, Murray shows that it is possible
to not only describe the properties of object-capabilities with CSP,
but also the capabilities themselves. It is thus possible to reason
about a CSP model for object-capability as a substitution for the
real system, making it easier to prove the properties of the system.
Devriese, Birkedal and Pessens focus on the formal characteriza-
tion of object-capabilities in their paper “Reasoning about Object
Capabilities with Logical Relations and Effect Parametricity” [3]. In
this paper, they show that existing formal characterizations do not
capture capability safety, and therefore it is not sufficient for verify-
ing application security. To address this problem, they introduced
a relation that helps to deliver a better characterization.
The paper “Capabilities for Uniqueness and Borrowing” byHaller
and Odersky [9] states that it is important for a system of unique
objects to send messages over references, but the message is re-
stricted due to the ill-effects of aliases. To solve the aliasing problem,
they introduce a new type of uniqueness based on capabilities. This
uniqueness enforces an at-most-one consumption of references and
a notion of flexibility. To show that the new uniqueness is sound,
the authors implemented and verified their approach through a
simple example.
Swasey et al. introduce a logic called Object Capability Pattern
Logic (OCPL), to describe object-capabilities in their paper “Robust
and Compositional Verification of Object Capability Pattern” [18].
Their logic, makes it easier to prove the robustness of programs.
The paper “On Access Control, Capabilities, Their Equivalence
and Confused Deputy Attacks” by Rahani, Garg, and Rezk [16]
addresses the differences between access control, and capabilities
and states, and argue that that the two notions are fundamentally
different. Furthermore, they prove that it is not possible for capabil-
ities to prevent all attacks, and therefore a capability-based system
cannot be fully secure.
3.2 Implementational Aspect of
Object-Capability
A large share of the related work also presents how to implement
object-capability or how to ease their implementation.
Drossopoulou et al. present “The Need for Capability Policies” [4]
and “How to Break the Bank: Semantics of Capability Policies” [5].
Both papers state that since the policies for object-capability are
mostly only implicitly given, the code for the capabilities is often
tangled with the main program code. The solution they propose
is to make the policies explicit, with the programmer specifying
their expectations about the security properties of the program. In
the first paper [4], the authors state that this system would make
it easier to reason about the explicit policies, and to check them
for flaws. In addition, the second paper [5] states that a structured
specification is needed to express the policies and started designing
such a specification [5].
Another approach regarding the implementation of object-
capability was presented by Darya Mellicher in her thesis pro-
posal “Controlling Module Authority via Programming Language
Design” [11]. This approach proposes the use of a capability safe
module system for access-control. In the proposal, Mellicher draws
a first draft for such a system, which she and her co-authors also
present in the paper “A Capability-BasedModule System for Author-
ity Control" [12]. In this module system, each module is a statically
typed capability.
3.3 Other Focuses
We now present the papers which use object-capability or propose
similar approaches.
“Swapsies on the Internet” [6] and “Reasoning about Risk and
Trust in an Open World’ [7], both published by Drossopoulou et
al. define the concept of risk and trust, and base their examples on
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top of the object-capability model . For those examples, the authors
prove that the specifications for risk and trust are fulfilled.
An approach similar to object-capabilities is denied capabilities,
published in the paper “Deny Capabilities for Safe, Fast Actors” by
Clebsch et al. [2]. This model introduces a flexible type system,
which can be used to deny control, in a similar system to access
control.
The paper “Minimal Ownership for Active Objects” by Clarke
et al [1] states that it is natural for object-oriented languages to
use active objects as an approach to concurrency. Active objects
consist of an unshared state and a thread for control. The data
sharing should only be done by references, but this leads to aliasing
problems. To counter these problems, the authors prove that it is
possible to pass objects belonging to one active object to another
active object without copying the state. Although this paper does
not deal with object-capabilities per se, the concept of data sharing
over references is quite similar.
The last approach to object-capability is a model checker pub-
lished in “Dynamic Detection of Object Capability Violations
Through Model Checking” by Rhodes et al. [17]. With the help
of their model checker, the authors allow the visualization of leaks
in a system.
4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Through the large body of research conducted on the topic, we see
that object-capability has the potential to improve the security of
distributed programs. However, even if the potential for security
is there, it is not widely used, mostly due to convenience. Global
and static variables–which break the requirements for the object-
capability model–are commonly used, especially for short scripts.
Excluding their use from the beginning of a project could be an
efficient solution.
Most publications on the topic of object-capability focus on the
formal properties of the model, introducing extensions to the base
model, analyzing its properties, or describing analysis methods. Cur-
rent research agrees on the security of object-capability, although
restrictions to the model are required, in some cases.
Other publications focus on implementation approaches to
object-capabilities. The main two approaches are to make the poli-
cies for the model explicit (requiring a different program design to
divide the code between object-capabilities and program behaviour),
and to include object-capability modules directly in the program-
ming language. This last approach is fairly new and only proposes
early concepts for such a programming language.
Since the object-capability model is not included in most object-
oriented languages, future work to encourage its adoption could be
possible to provide a library of universal patterns. With the help
of such patterns, software developers could implement the model
in most object-oriented programming languages. This approach
would require the developer to know about the model and the
patterns, which could be achieved by including documentation in
the style guides of the target programming languages.
All in all, object-capability has a high potential for enhancing
software security. However knowledge about this technique is not
widespread and object-capability is therefore rarely used. We en-
courage researchers and practitioners to spread the word about the
potential of the object-capability model, and aim to include it into
style guides and pattern lists.
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